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Abstract
This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual ver-
sus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with
random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thir-
teen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments,
we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in
the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-
dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can
be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the
efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of efficient equilibrium
play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that
even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient
to significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with
respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our
hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 induces, under suitable con-
ditions, successful coordination more frequently than common knowl-
edge.
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1 Epistemic attitudes: The formal and the
experimental
The purpose of this paper is to discuss–from the point of view of formal
epistemology–some experimental results on the role of common knowledge
as a coordination device in a weak-link coordination game.
Common knowledge has long been regarded as a fundamental compo-
nent in the modeling of rational interaction. As such it features prominently,
though informally, in Nash’s characterization of equilibrium. As game theory
evolved towards capturing increasingly more refined solution concepts, com-
mon knowledge was there to stay as a fundamental modeling assumption.
Harsanyi and Selten, to mention a particularly relevant example from the
point of view of the present paper, put forward a view according to which
the assumption of common knowledge of the players’ rationality is sufficient
to ensure the joint selection of efficient equilibria in (non-pure) coordination
games.
In a line of research which for a long time has been developed almost
independently of the game-theoretic one, epistemic logicians have advanced,
over the past two decades, rigorous characterizations of the epistemic atti-
tudes of both individual and group knowledge and belief. The emergence of
multi-agent epistemic logic thus enabled, around mid 1990s, the development
of rigorous analyses of the epistemic conditions underlying game theoretic so-
lution concepts.
The ensuing investigations on the connection between rational agents’
epistemic attitudes and their strategic behavior tended to fall into two sel-
dom communicating categories, the formal and the experimental. This paper
constitutes an attempt at fostering the cross-fertilization between those lines
of research. It aims at so doing by taking full advantage of the mutual
feedback that experimental economics and formal epistemology can give one
another. Formal epistemology lends methodological clarity to experimental
analysis, especially concerning modeling assumptions. In turn, experimental
analysis gives empirical substance to the formal analysis of epistemic atti-
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tudes of group knowledge. This results in a virtuous circle, which we expect
to be a key feature of the emerging field of experimental formal epistemol-
ogy. From this vantage point, our contribution speaks to the community
of experimental economists, to game theorists interested in the refinement of
epistemic conditions for solution concepts, and to the relatively younger com-
munity of logicians and philosophers of logic interested in empirical evidence
on modes of reasoning1)
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the weak-link coor-
dination game used in our experiment and Section 2.1 discusses the relevant
related literature. The experimental design is then illustrated in Section 3.
Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the experimental results regarding
choice behavior (Section 4.2) and the subjects’ beliefs (Section 4.1). Section
6 draws some general conclusions about our rather surprising findings and
delineates what we envisage to be promising future lines of development of
the research reported in this paper. The remainder of this Section aims at
illustrating the motivation of this work by presenting an outline of how the
recent research on epistemic attitudes has tended to fall under the “formal”
and the “experimental” headings, with very little overlap.
1.1 The formal
Robert Aumann opens his classic paper on correlated equilibrium by review-
ing the concept of Nash Equilibrium and asks
why should any player assume that the other players will play
their components [of a Nash Equilibrium] and indeed why should
they? [. . .] In a two-person game, for example, Player 1 would
play his component only if he believes that Player 2 will play his;
this in turn would be justified only by 2’s belief that 1 will play
his component; and so on. (Aumann, 1987)
The von Neumann-Nash analysis of game-theoretic equilibrium relies es-
sentially on the concept of best-response which is normatively prescribed to a
rational player only under the assumption of the players’ common knowledge
of each others’ rationality (and, clearly, of the game). It is certainly beyond
the scope of the present paper to discuss which solution concept is appropri-
ate for a justified formal characterisation of rational interaction. Yet what
1See van Benthem (2008) and Verbrugge (2009) for two influential position papers, and
D’Agostino (2010) for an example of a logic for realistic agents.
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Aumann’s remark clearly illustrates is the centrality of epistemic attitudes in
the game-theoretic analysis of rational interaction.
In hindsight two things appear to be rather surprising. The first is that
game theorists, and economists in general, have been rather happy with an
intuitive (as opposed to mathematically rigorous) notion of “knowledge” for
their modeling until Aumann (1976) put forward what have become known
as Aumann structures. In an nutshell, the construction of the Aumann struc-
ture begins, in continuity with the (single-agent) decision theoretic tradition,
by postulating the existence of a state space, which is assumed to provide a
complete description of the “world”. To each individual agent (in a finite set,
interpreted as “player”) is associated a specific partition of the state space.
As in Savage’s model, events – the object of the agents’ knowledge– are
subsets of the set of states. The operations of individual, mutual and com-
mon knowledge are defined by suitably constrained operators on the algebra
generated by the partitions of the state space. Aumann’s formalization has
effectively given rise the actively researched area of epistemic game theory2.
This leads us to the second surprising fact (in hindsight), namely that
it took a relatively long time for game theorists and formal epistemologists
to realize that they were working on essentially similar problems. Indeed,
philosophers have long been interested in epistemic attitudes as specific in-
stances of the wider class of intentional attitudes. Put very crudely, epistemic
attitudes capture the relation between an agent’s reasoning (and disposition
to act) and the information they possess. The first systematic attempt at
giving this relation a rigorous logical formalization appeared in (Hintikka,
1962). This work paved the way for the syntactic development of epistemic
logic which was soon to be complemented by the introduction of relational
semantics (or Kripke frames)3. By the mid-1990s epistemic logic was a stan-
dard analytical tool in artificial intelligence (Meyer and van der Hoek, 1995)
Since Hintikka’s pioneering work, epistemic logicians have tended to focus
on normative models of individual knowing and believing4. These notions
were extended to their multi-agent counterpart in the context of artificial
2See Brandenburger (2008) for a terse overview of the field.
3See e.g. Blackburn et al. (2001) for a state-of-the-art introduction to Modal logic and
Blackburn et al. (2007) for a comprehensive account of its development.
4Recent attention has been devoted to the logic of “being informed ” and that of “being
aware”. See Allo (2011) and Halpern and Pucella (2007), Halpern and Reˆgo (2008) for
recent overviews. On awareness, the interested reader can consult Burkhard Schipper’s
bibliography Schipper (2012).
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intelligence5. In an attempt to make this paper as self-contained as possible,
we now briefly recall the central epistemic attitudes captured in multi-agent
epistemic logic, namely individual, mutual and common knowledge6.
Let N be a set of agents, S be a set of states (or “possible worlds”)
and θ, φ etc. be sentences of some propositional (modal) logic. The key
intuition captured by epistemic logics is that when being in epistemic state,
say, s, agent i may access other epistemic states, say t. This motivates
the introduction of an accessibility relation Ri ⊆ S2 (one for each agent
i ∈ N). We say that an agent i ∈ N in epistemic state s ∈ S knows θ
just if θ is true (in the classical logic sense) in all epistemic states which are
accessible to i from s. Distinct formalizations of “knowledge” (and “belief”)
arise from distinct constraints that we impose on the relation R. In the
most widely studied (multi-agent) epistemic logic, known as S5, R is an
equivalence relation, thus making the resulting logical characterization of
knowledge effectively equivalent to that provided by Aumann’s structures.
This individual knowledge operator naturally extends to groups of agents
as follows7. Suppose, for definitiveness, that i and j are the only members
of group G ⊆ N . If both i and j know θ, we say that “θ is mutual knowledge
among group G”. Since this latter can be expressed as a well-formed formula
of epistemic logic, the construction can be iterated, so we can have that “i
and j know that θ is mutual knowledge among group G”. This sentence
thus expresses second-level mutual knowledge, because i knows that j knows
that they both know θ, and so on. When the mutual knowledge operator is
iterated infinitely many times, we say that θ is common knowledge between
i and j, a concept introduced8 by Lewis (1969).
Over the past two decades or so, the formal analysis of (group) epistemic
attitudes has led the momentous development of both formal epistemology
(see, e.g. Hendricks, 2005) and epistemic game theory9. As to this latter,
it is well worth recalling how the rigorous characterization of epistemic atti-
5Fagin et al. (1996) collects various works providing the first systematic formalization
of the epistemic interaction of logical agents.
6Self-contained formal presentations can be found in Fagin et al. (1996) and van Dit-
marsch et al. (2007).
7Cf. what Aumann dubs “syntactical structures” in Aumann (1999)
8For an overview on the notion of common knowledge, see Vanderschraaf and Sillari
(2007).
9In turn, both areas contributed essentially to the development of the social software
research programme (see, e.g. Parikh, 2002)
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tudes has resulted in a much sharper analysis of the “epistemic conditions”
yielding various kinds of solution concepts. A particularly interesting case in
point, from the point of view of this paper, is the demotion of the common-
knowledge condition for Nash equilibrium put forward by Aumann and Bran-
denburger (1995), where it is shown that decidedly weaker conditions (some
involving mutual knowledge) suffice for the justification of the classical so-
lution concept. The main result reported in this paper, namely that in the
weak-link game of our experimental setting mutual knowledge leads to the
selection of efficient equilibria more frequently than common knowledge, cer-
tainly adds experimental support to such a demotion of common knowledge
in rational interaction.
In addition to making rigorous the otherwise rather subtle distinction
between mutual and common knowledge, the general framework of formal
epistemology caters for another conceptual distinction playing a fundamental
role in the present investigation, namely the distinction between normative
and descriptive accounts of epistemic attitudes. Whilst the former prescribe
how idealized agents should behave in order to qualify as rational, the lat-
ter aims at describing the behavior of actual agents (e.g. our experimental
subjects) facing choice problems which involve reasoning about other agents’
epistemic attitudes.
It is commonly accepted that normative models of rationality play a cru-
cial role in helping real decision makers correcting their mistakes. This role
of normative models is grounded on the assumption that whilst their cogni-
tive limitations may never allow them to fully attain the recommendations
of the model, real decision makers should aim at the standard of rationality
captured by the norm. Now, the formal work on multiagent epistemic logics
which we have briefly surveyed in this Section undoubtedly suggests that
common-knowledge provides the most favourable condition for coordination
in strategic interaction. The experimental results discussed in this paper,
however, tell another story.
1.2 The experimental
With the present contribution we relate to two connected strands of experi-
mental and behavioral literature10, namely the extensive experimental litera-
10For a primer on the use of the experimental method in economics, see (Friedman et.
al, 1994) for a critical survey of experiments in game theory see (Camerer, 2003).
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ture on coordination games and the philosophical and experimental literature
on social conventions and social norms.
Among the early advocates of the empirical investigation of coordination
games is Thomas Schelling, who, at the beginning of the 1960s pointed out
how
One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what under-
standings can be perceived in a non-zero sum game of maneuver
any more than one can prove, by purely formal deduction, that a
particular joke is bound to be funny (Schelling, 1980, p.164)
The power of “focal points” to facilitate coordination, which Schelling
himself tested in a series of informal experiments with his students, was first
identified empirically by Mehta et al. (1994), who introduced the notion of
“Schelling salience” to refer to features - such as action labels or others (see,
e.g. Bacharach and Bernasconi , 1997; Cubitt and Sudgen, 2003) - able to
confer unambiguous distinctiveness to one specific equilibrium. The power of
“Schelling salience” to focus players’ expectations on some unique outcome
and hence to solve coordination problems is most evident in so-called games
of pure coordination, i.e., games in which all equilibria are payoff-equivalent.
As a result, the essence of this kind of coordination problems consists only in
avoiding a disequilibrium outcome. A different, but closely related class of
coordination games contains games with multiple equilibria, some of which
are more rewarding than others for all players. Typically, these games em-
body a tension between efficiency and security (or risk-dominance), as play-
ers choosing strategies that support payoff-superior equilibria incur in greater
losses if their choice is not matched by all other players. As a consequence,
two types of coordination failure may occur: a disequilibrium outcome and
coordination on a suboptimal equilibrium.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) formalized the tradeoff implicit in these games
and stated that rational players, in the presence of common knowledge of ra-
tionality, should select the efficient (i.e., payoff-dominant) equilibrium. How-
ever, a plethora of experimental studies on the stag hunt and weak-link games
(see, e.g. Cooper et. al, 1990, 1992; Van Huyck et al., 1990) has convincingly
demonstrated that Harsanyi and Selten’s prediction holds true only under
very special conditions, while in all remaining cases coordination failure oc-
curs almost invariably. Starting from these results, most of the subsequent
experimental studies on coordination have been aimed at identifying the
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efficiency-enhancing properties of several features of the strategic interaction
at hand. Our study contributes to this strand of literature by identifying
the epistemic conditions that, in a specific experimental setup highly con-
ducive to coordination failure, render external interventions in the form of
third party announcements effective in directing the players’ choices towards
superior and more risky equilibria.
The second strand of research to which our investigation is related in-
cludes the philosophical and experimental literature on social conventions
and social norms pioneered by the game theoretically informed work of Lewis
(1969) on conventions. David Lewis’ account of social convention is based
on coordination games. When players’ interests are aligned (as in pure co-
ordination games) and interactions are recurrent, players may succeed in
coordinating their behavior by selecting a salient equilibrium. If they re-
currently succeed in coordinating, the regular solution becomes salient by
virtue of precedent, and, according to Lewis’s definition, is a social conven-
tion. When there is a trade-off between security and efficiency (as in the
kind of coordination game our experimental work focuses on), payoff consid-
erations make the choice of salient equilibrium particularly relevant. Lewis’s
account requires that conventions be common knowledge and the importance
of such an epistemic requirement, especially with reference to salience, has
been a debated issue in the literature (see Section 2.1 below). The present
contribution investigates the effectiveness of various levels of epistemic ac-
cess to the salience-inducing coordination device (i.e. a suggestion to play
the strategy supporting the efficient equilibrium), thus contributing to the
discussion on the role of common knowledge in coordination and convention.
Lewis’s work on social conventions has spun a vast literature in philos-
ophy of social sciences. Particularly relevant are accounts of social norms
based, to varying degrees, on Lewis’s idea of convention as coordination
(cf. for instance Ullman-Margalit, 1977; Sugden, 1986, 2004; Young, 1998;
Vanderschraaf, 1995), culminating in Cristina Bicchieri’s theory of social
norms (Bicchieri, 2006). In Bicchieri’s account, a social norm transforms a
mixed-motive game into a coordination game: when a social norm is in place
and agents hold the relevant expectations about others’ preferences, norm-
abidance behavior is the preferred course of action while the same course of
action would have been dispreferred in the absence of a social norm. The ex-
pectations involved in Bicchieri’s account of social norms are of two (kinds:
(i) empirical expectations (first-order beliefs that others will conform) and
(ii) normative expectations (second-order beliefs that other will expect one
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to conform). Extensive experimental work by Bicchieri and collegues (cf.,
e.g., Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Bicchieri and Chavez, 2010) show that empiri-
cal expectations by themselves may not be sufficient to motivate compliance
to social norms, and that the presence of aligned second-order, normative ex-
pectations, can trigger compliance. While the present experiment does not
deal directly with social norms, it does look at how first and second-order
expectations as elicited by different experimental conditions affect coordina-
tion outcomes, thus offering insights on the role and nature of coordinating
expectations.
2 The game
Arguably the most prominent testbeds of the risk-efficiency tradeoff in the
domain of coordination games are the stag hunt and minimum effort (or
weak link) games. We limit ourselves to describe the latter11. On-time
aircraft departures are prototypical examples of coordination problems of
the weak-link type (see, e.g., (Knez and Simester, 2001),) since the airplane
cannot take-off before all operations (e.g., fueling, security checks, loading of
luggage, boarding of passengers, etc.) have been completed. Other examples
include relationships between different branches of a bank, the writing of
a grant proposal involving several participants, an edited volume involving
several authors, and many others (Camerer and Knez, 1996, 1997). Common
to all aforementioned examples is the fact that output is determined by the
agent exerting the lowest level of effort (the “weak link”), and any effort
above the minimum is wasted.
A weak-link game is defined byN players who must simultaneously choose
a natural number x in {1, 2, . . . , X}. The payoff function for the normal form
game is defined as follows:
pi(xi) = a+ b ∗min(x1, x2, . . . xn)− c[xi −min(x1, x2, . . . xn)] (1)
where xi is the number chosen by player i, and a, b and c are positive
parameters. xi is intuitively interpreted as the “effort level chosen by player
i”. Provided that the payoff function is common knowledge, the game has X
11In fact the minimum effort game is an extension of the stag hunt game to the case of
n strategies with n > 2. See, e.g., Camerer 2003, ch. 7.
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strict Nash equilibria, corresponding to the X action combinations in which
all players select the same effort level. Furthermore, the Nash equilibria can
be Pareto-ranked, with the combination {x1 = x2 = · · · = xn = X} being the
efficient, or payoff-dominant equilibrium. Viceversa, the{x1 = x2 = · · · =
xn = 1} corresponds to the secure equilibrium 12.
In our experiment we chose the following parameter values: N = 2,
X = 7, a = 6, b = c = 1. For these parameters, the game presents seven
Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria, with the combinations {x1 = x2 = 7} and
{x1 = x2 = 1} representing the payoff-dominant equilibrium and the secure
equilibrium, respectively. Each player is penalized the further her choice is
from the minimum in the group. The resulting payoff matrix13 is shown in
Table 1.
My choice
Minumum number chosen
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 7 - - - - - -
2 6 8 - - - - -
3 5 7 9 - - - -
4 4 6 8 10 - - -
5 3 5 7 9 11 - -
6 2 4 6 8 10 12 -
7 1 3 5 7 9 11 13
Table 1: Payoff of the weak-link game.
2.1 Related literature
The first comprehensive experiment on the weak link game was conducted by
Van Huyck et al. (1990), varying group size, parameter values and matching
protocol: unravelling to the lowest minimum over time always occurred with
large groups (i.e., N=9,14) interacting repeatedly. Pairs did slightly better
12“Security” is an extension of Harsanyi and Selten’s risk-dominance principle to games
with more than two strategies. A “secure” equilibrium is selected when all players choose
in accordance with the maximin criterion.
13While in a two-person game the natural choice would that of depicting one’s own
choice against the other player’s choice instead of own against minimum of the two, we
opted to use the latter representation in order to make our results fully comparable with
the previous literature.
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but never converged when randomly rematched in each round: only when
interacting repeatedly in fixed pairs were players able to coordinate on the
payoff-dominant equilibrium. The results in Van Huyck et al. (1990) have
been extensively replicated ceteris paribus. Taking these findings as point
of departure, subsequent studies have investigated different ways to engi-
neer coordination success in the lab: pre-play communication, inter-group
competition, increased financial incentives, gradual group growth, and lead-
ership are all mechanisms that have been shown to increase the likelihood of
efficient coordination; others, such as increased feedback, have been tested
with inconclusive results (see Devetag and Ortmann (2007) for a review of
experiments on both the weak link and stag hunt coordination games). Of
particular relevance for our study are those experiments that tested the ef-
fectiveness of advice, either from a third party of from players themselves.
Van Huyck et al. (1992) tested the role of non-binding, publicly announced
external assignments in two-person coordination games; their results indi-
cate that assignments are not considered credible when they conflict with
payoff-dominance or symmetry. It has to be pointed out, however, that in
their games the two principles of payoff-dominance and risk-dominance do
not conflict. Chaudhuri et. al (2009) tested intergenerational advice in the
minimum effort game with large groups: they found out that the payoff-
dominant equilibrium was selected only when advice not only was public
and publicly shared (i.e., when all advice from previous generation mem-
bers was made accessible to all new generation members, and this fact was
common knowledge), but was also common knowledge in the sense of being
read aloud. The authors call the first condition “almost common knowledge”
as in Rubinstein (1989), and in their experiments it leads groups to select
the Pareto-worst outcome. Only the common knowledge condition leads to
Pareto efficiency. Bangun et al. (2006) replicate the design by Van Huyck et
al. (1992) using a stag-hunt game embedding a clear conflict between payoff-
dominance and risk-dominance. They show that, unlike the Van Huyck et al.
(1992) experiment, an external assignment is sufficient to produce coordina-
tion on the payoff-dominant outcome, even when the assignment is “almost
common knowledge”. Finally, Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit (2010) test the
power of an external assignment (in the form of a recommendation to choose
the strategy consistent with the efficient equilibrium) in the weak link game
with groups of five players: their 2x2 between-subject design tests fixed vs.
random matching, and “common knowledge” vs. “almost common knowl-
edge” of the assignment. A further treatment tests the power of an increased
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bonus for coordination. As in the Chaudhuri et. al (2009) study, “common
knowledge” refers to the recommendation being read aloud, while “almost
common knowledge” implies that the recommendation is handed out to each
subject to be read privately, and the fact that everybody is given the same
recommendation is common knowledge. Their findings show behavior that is
largely consistent with behavior in (Chaudhuri et. al , 2009): with random
re-matching of groups in every round, only the increased financial incen-
tive (publicly announced) can induce efficient coordination; neither “com-
mon knowledge” nor “almost common knowledge” of the recommendation
are sufficient; fixed groups are generally able to reach successful coordination
even in absence of external interventions. This last finding is at odds with
the finding of Chaudhuri et. al (2009), in which players interacting in fixed
groups failed to coordinate successfully even in the presence of a credible
assignment; the difference is most likely due to the different content of the
advice (in the study done by Chaudhuri and colleagues, many players advised
their successors to actually select the secure equilibrium), and to the larger
group size of the Chaudhuri et. al (2009) design, a parameter which has been
shown to be crucial in determining the probability of efficient coordination
in the weak-link game.
While in (Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit, 2010) a distinction is made be-
tween public and common knowledge of advice (their conditions 1 and 2,
respectively), it is clear from the discussion above that the two conditions
are both common knowledge conditions. The former condition (in which sub-
jects receive a sheet of paper stating the advice and that every other player
receives the exact same advice and message) induces first-order knowledge
of the advice (because of the text on the paper), second-order knowledge
that everyone has knowledge of the advice (because the fact that everyone
receives the same text is publicly known), third-order knowledge that ev-
eryone knows that everyone has knowledge of the advice (because everyone
knows that everyone knows everyone has received the same text), and so on.
Of course, subjects could be doubtful about whether others have read the
message, paid attention to all of its contents, etc., hence the notion that this
is an almost common knowledge condition.
None of the previous studies on the efficiency-enhancing properties of
external advice has tested epistemic conditions weaker than common or at
least almost common knowledge. Our paper fills this gap in the literature,
examining, along with common knowledge, first- and second-order mutual
knowledge of advice. First-order mutual knowledge is obtained by an ex-
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perimental setup that induces knowledge of advice in each player, without
offering subjects the opportunity to draw inferences beyond first-order, i.e.
the experimenter does not give them enough information to infer that oth-
ers have knowledge of advice. Second-order mutual knowledge is similarly
obtained by a setup in which knowledge that one’s opponent has knowledge
of advice can be inferred, but knowing that the opponent knows that one
knows that cannot.
Our experimental work is linked to a further strand of literature, namely
that on game-theoretic accounts of social conventions. Cubitt and Sugden (in
Cubitt and Sudgen (2003)) have advanced a formal reconstruction of Lewis’s
account of social convention that stresses the importance of inductive rea-
soning as based of common knowledge of precedent. On the other hand,
evolutionary accounts of social conventions (cf. Binmore (2008), Skyrms
(1996)) deny the relevance of common knowledge for sustaining a social con-
vention (cf. Sillari (2008) and Rescorla (2011) for overviews of the debate.)
Our experimental study provides a contribution to this debate, as our exper-
imental conditions allow us to observe the impact of different kinds of group
knowledge on the formation of conventions. To be sure, our experiment does
not deal with convention formation, as iterations of the interactive choice are
numerous enough to speak of an emerging convention. However, our experi-
ment does yield insights on a crucial mechanism of convention formation, i.e.
that of salience building. In Lewis’s account of convention as it is discussed
in the recent debate, a specific kind of salience (precedent) is at work in
perpetuating a convention. Instead, we focus on plausible mechanisms other
than precedent for the emergence of salience, in particular we observe how
subjects react to advice. Notice that the experimenters’ advice does not add
any factual knowledge to what subjects are supposed to (commonly) know,
i.e. the structure of the game and payoffs. Rather than providing knowl-
edge, the suggestion received by the subjects makes them aware of a relevant
item of knowledge or, in other words, makes such an item salient to them.
Assuming, with Lewis, that subjects coordinate by virtue of salience, our ex-
periment then discriminates the effectiveness of salience-building mechanisms
in (weak-link) coordination games.
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3 Experimental Design
Ninety participants were recruited from Luiss Guido Carli in Rome. Par-
ticipants were undergraduate students enrolled in the various programs of
the University, economics, law and political science. All experiments were
conducted at the CESARE experimental economics Lab at Luiss, by using a
dedicated software. The payoff function was the one shown in Table 1 above.
Most sessions were conducted with 10 participants, with a few containing
8 participants. Each session consisted of a total of 13 rounds of play of the
stage game. Participants were randomly assigned to computer terminals iso-
lated from one another by glass separators. Initial instructions (equal for all
treatments) explaining general rules were distributed in paper copy and were
also read aloud by the experimenter. At this stage, subject were instructed
that the experiment was divided in two parts, and that further instructions
would appear on everybody’s monitor as the experiment progressed. Control
questions were administered to assure that the rules of the game had been
correctly understood by all. A paper copy of the payoff matrix was given
to each subject, and the same matrix also appeared on each participant’s
screen when submitting their choice for the round. Subjects were told that
they would be randomly paired with another anonymous participant from
the room in each round. When everybody had entered their choice, each
subject received private feedback regarding chosen number, minimum num-
ber chosen in the pair and payoff earned in the round. In order to enhance
independence between rounds, the final payment was based on a randomly
selected round, and this was explicitly stated in the instructions.
The first three rounds were equal for all treatments and were played with
no external intervention, to increase comparability with previous experiments
(Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit, 2010) and to allow adequate learning of the
payoff function. In fact, we wanted to avoid subjects following the experi-
menter’s suggestion simply as a result of inexperience and being unaware of
all its possible implications.
After the third round had been completed and before subjects could en-
ter their choice for the fourth round, the experiment in all treatments was
interrupted and subjects were asked to state the following two forecasts on
a sheet of paper:
• the average number chosen in period 4 by all participants in the session
• the average forecast expressed by all participants in the session
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Sincere belief elicitation was incentivized in the following way: for each
forecast, subjects earned 1 ECU minus the difference between the stated
average and the actual average, up to 0. After all participants had stated
their beliefs, the experiment was resumed, and subjects could make their
choices for round 4 and subsequent rounds.
The following four treatments were conducted. In the control treatment
(2 sessions, N =16), subject were asked to state their beliefs at the end of
the third round, and then asked to proceed with making their choices for
round 4 and the remaining rounds, with no further instructions.
In the mutual knowledge of level 1 treatment (3 sessions, N = 30), before
subjects were asked to make their predictions and choice for round 4 and
at the beginning of all subsequent rounds of play, the following statement
appeared on every participant’s monitor:
We suggest you to pick number 7
In fact, note that, if both you and the other participant pick
7, you both earn the maximum possible payoff, 13 ECUs
The fact that the same suggestion appeared on every participant’s mon-
itor was not common knowledge14. Subjects had to click on “continue” to
move from the suggestion screen to the choice screen, to assure that the
suggestion was not overlooked.
In the mutual knowledge of level 2 treatment (3 sessions, N = 26), before
subjects were asked to make their forecasts and choice for period 4, and at
the beginning of all subsequent rounds of play, the same statement shown
above appeared on every participant’s monitor. In addition, the lower part
of the screen reported the following:
Click on “send” to send this suggestion to the
participant with whom you are paired in this round.
Subjects had to click “send” to move to the following screen. The follow-
ing screen reported the sentence shown below:
the participant with whom you are paired in this
round is sending you this message:
14This design feature marks an important difference in our setup with respect to that
in (Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit, 2010).
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followed by the suggestion text.
The subject was asked to click “read” to send the other player a confir-
mation that the message had been read before moving to the next screen.
The last screen reported:
the participant with whom you are paired notifies
you that they have received the message that you
sent them.
Then the choice screen appeared. Neither the suggestion appearance nor
the message exchange was common knowledge among participants15.
Finally, in the common knowledge treatment (2 sessions, N = 18), the
suggestion text was read aloud by the experimenter before subjects were
asked to state their forecast for period 4. The suggestion was read aloud at
the beginning of round 4 only, and not at the beginning of every subsequent
round. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate two samples of the computer interface used
in the experiment.
Figure 1: The suggestion screen
15Notice that while this protocol can legitimately generate knowledge of the suggestion
up to level 2, it also legitimately generates a third-order belief, as each player can believe
(but not know) that the other player has seen the acknowledgment sent by the former
player.
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Figure 2: The choice screen
Before moving on to stating our hypotheses and analyzing the data, we
would like to address the issue of what in fact is the content of the proposi-
tion on which the present experiment hinges. The suggestion that the exper-
imenters send to the subjects contains two elements: one is the suggestion
itself (“we suggest you pick number 7”) and the other is a factual explana-
tion of the rationale behind the suggestion (“note that if both you and the
other participant pick 7, you both earn the maximum possible payoff, 13
ECU’s’.’) As the message read by subjects contains a factual explanation of
the rationale behind the suggestion, it is reasonable to believe that subjects
are led to an indicative reading of the suggestion, so that the content of, e.g.,
the proposition commonly known in the third treatments is “experimenters
suggest to pick 7,” or perhaps “experimenters suggest that I pick 7.”16
To facilitate the exposition of the results, we will refer to our four treat-
ments according to the following stipulation:
• control - C = control
• mutual knowledge - MK = mutual knowledge of level 1
16The indication of a rationale for the suggestion is thus important to avoid that subjects
understand the suggestion in imperative terms, as for instance in “experimenters suggest
that I should pick 7.”. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for prompting us to make
this clarification.
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• message - Message = mutual knowledge of level 2
• common knowledge - CK = common knowledge.
The control treatment is necessary to provide us with a benchmark for
the frequency of coordination, as well as to control for learning and restart
effects. The other three treatments allow us to test the effect that adding
one level of knowledge has on the probability of coordination on the efficient
equilibrium.
The choice to use the payoff function of (Van Huyck et al., 1990) is moti-
vated by the fact that this payoff function has already been tested for a group
size of two players with random matching. Results have shown high variabil-
ity and no convergence over time in this condition. To our knowledge, this is
the worst coordination outcome that has been reported in a minimum effort
game with group size of two. As a high level of coordination failure in our
baseline treatment is a necessary condition for our experimental treatments
to be of interest, we chose to implement the same payoff function used by
Van Huyck and co-authors.
Experiments lasted forty minutes on average, including instruction time.
Average total earnings were equal to 13.5 euro, including the 2 euro show up
fee.
We formulated the following hypotheses:
• coordination failure is the modal outcome in the control treatment
• both the share of choices equal to 7 and the frequency of efficient co-
ordination outcomes increase as more knowledge levels are added
Hence, we expected to observe widespread coordination failure in the
control treatment, and higher frequencies of coordination success as moving
from the control to the common knowledge treatment.
4 Results
4.1 Analysis of choice behavior
Figure 3 reports the average choices, whilst average minima and relative
frequency of choices equal to 7 over time in the four treatments are reported
in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. All values are pooled across sessions.
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The following facts are worth noticing: first, both minima and 7 choices in the
control treatment indicate widespread coordination failure with no detectable
trend over time. Minima stabilize around 4 and choices of 7 around 40 per
cent. Hence, the control treatment by and large replicates previous findings
obtained with the same group size and matching protocol in (Van Huyck et
al., 1990). Secondly, all experimental treatments reveal an improvement in
coordination with respect to the control, as hypothesized.
However, somewhat surprisingly and contrary to our hypothesis, the in-
crease is not monotonic in knowledge levels. More specifically, the highest
values are attained in the message treatment, while the values for the mutual
knowledge and common knowledge treatments lie between the two extremes
of “control” and “message”.
Figure 3: Average choices over time, all sessions pooled
Figure 6 reports the frequency of the choice of 7 in rounds 4-13 separately
for each treatment, and in rounds 1-3 for all treatments combined. Figure 7
reports the same information, respectively, for round 4 only and for round 1
only.
Figure 6 clearly shows that, overall, the message treatment was by far
the most effective in fostering choice of the strategy supporting the efficient
equilibrium. The second finding worth noticing is that mutual knowledge of
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Figure 4: Average minima over time, all sessions pooled
Figure 5: Relative frequency of choices equal to 7 over time, all sessions
pooled
level 1 is able to induce the choice of 7 in a proportion comparable to that
attained in the common knowledge treatment.
By comparing the same data in round 4 only, as reported in Figure 7, we
can measure the effect of different levels of knowledge excluding the poten-
tially confounding factor given by message repetition. Moreover, the salience
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of the publicly read announcement in the CK treatment is supposed to be
highest in round 4 as compared to subsequent rounds. Hence, the CK treat-
ment is given its best chance to produce efficient coordination immediately
after the public announcement. Data from round 4 suggest that the message
treatment is the most effective even without the aid of message repetition;
in fact, choices of 7 amount to 80 per cent of all choices in that treatment.
The CK treatment is the second best, with 60 per cent of 7 choices. MK,
however, does almost as well as the CK treatment, whereas the percentage
in the control treatment does not differ from that observed in the first three
rounds of play.
Figure 6: Frequency of choices equal to 7 in rounds 4-13, disaggregated by
treatment, and in rounds 1-3, all treatments pooled
The relative ranking of the four different knowledge levels on goodness
of coordination is further supported by data on equilibrium play. Figure 8
reports the percentage of play consistent with the efficient equilibrium (i.e.,
both players in the pair picking 7) in the four treatments in rounds 4-13.
In the message treatment more than half of play (52 per cent) resulted in
coordination on the efficient equilibrium, whereas data for the CK treatment
and for the MK treatment amount to 28.8 per cent and 27.3 per cent, respec-
tively. Hence, again, mutual knowledge of level 1 is comparable to common
knowledge in its efficiency-enhancing effects, and mutual knowledge of level
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Figure 7: Frequency of choices equal to 7 in round 4, disaggregated by treat-
ment, and in round 1, all treatments pooled.
2 fares substantially better than common knowledge. In accordance with
our hypothesis and with previous results, the control treatment results in
the highest inefficiency, with only 13.8 per cent of efficient equilibrium play.
Consistently, data on the standard deviation of choices in the four treatments
in round 4-13 (Figure 9) reveal that the message treatment reduces strate-
gic uncertainty the most with respect to the control, while the MK and CK
treatment values are indistinguishable.
Pairwise comparisons between choices in the first round in the differ-
ent treatments reveal that there are no statistically significant differences
in choice distributions in period 1 (Mann-Whitney U test; control-mutual
knowledge p = .65; control-message p = .499; control-common knowledge
p = .95; mutual knowledge-message p = .83; mutual knowledge-common
knowledge p = .51; message-common knowledge p = .44. All p-values are
two-tailed).
Table 2 reports results of the Fisher’s exact test on the differences in the
share of 7 choices in rounds 4-13, and Table 3 reports results of the same
test on the frequency of efficient equilibrium play. All differences are highly
significant except that between MK and CK.
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Figure 8: Percentage of equilibrium play in rounds 4-13
Figure 9: Standard deviation of choices in rounds 4-13, disaggregated by
treatment
4.2 Analysis of beliefs
Figure 10 shows the distribution of first order beliefs (i.e., subjects’ forecasts
about the average of all participants’ choices in round 4) by treatment. It
23
Control Mutual knowledge Message Common knowledge
Control p = .0061 p = .0001 p = .0047
Mutual knowledge p = .0001 p = .7057
Message p = .0008
Common knowledge
Table 2: Fisher’s exact test on the frequency of choices 7 in the different
treatments in rounds 4-13 (all p-values are two-tailed).
Control Mutual knowledge Message Common knowledge
Control p = .0010 p = .0001 p = .0009
Mutual knowledge p = .0001 p = .7528
Message p = .0001
Common knowledge
Table 3: Fisher’s exact test on the frequency of equilibrium play in the
different treatments in rounds 4-13 (all p-values are two-tailed).
is noteworthy that beliefs behavior is highly consistent with choice behavior,
in that a shift of the distribution in the direction of higher numbers can be
detected when moving from the control treatment to the MK, CK and mes-
sage treatments. In the message treatment, roughly 65 per cent of forecasts
are concentrated on the value 7.
Table 4 reports some descriptive statistics on first order, second order
beliefs and choices in round 4 by treatment17.
High consistency between beliefs and choices is revealed by looking at the
column of mean values. Data on beliefs reveal important insights: first, they
support the hypothesis that the suggestion (and its related knowledge levels)
rendered subjects on average more optimistic, and greater optimism in turn
induced the choice of the risky action significantly more often with respect
to the absence of an external suggestion18. In other words, an experimenter
17One subject in the control treatment stated a first order belief equal to 10, one subject
in the message treatment stated a second order belief equal to 42, and one subject in the
common knowledge treatment stated a second order belief equal to 8. We eliminated these
outliers from the computation of the average values and of the subsequent correlation
indexes. The results of the correlation do not change if we include the outliers. We did
not observe any anomalous behavior in these subjects at the choice level, hence they may
have not understood the prediction task correctly.
18Notice also that, since the elicited beliefs are beliefs in the average choice of action
of all other participants in the session, choosing an action higher than one’s expressed
prediction denotes optimist risk-seeking behavior.
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Figure 10: Distribution of beliefs by treatment
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
1st order belief CONTROL 15 1 7 4,57 1,568
2nd order belief CONTROL 16 1 7 4,31 1,740
Choice in round 4 CONTROL 16 1 7 5,13 1,962
1st order belief MK 30 1 7 5,47 1,630
2nd order belief MK 30 1 7 5,58 1,602
Choice in round MK 30 1 7 5,73 1,999
1st order belief MESSAGE 26 3 7 6,18 1,311
2nd order belief MESSAGE 25 4 7 6,37 1,026
Choice in round MESSAGE 26 3 7 6,58 1,027
1st order belief CK 18 2 7 5,88 1,597
2nd order belief CK 17 4 7 6,00 1,225
Choice in round CK 18 2 7 5,83 1,724
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on first order, second order beliefs and choices
in round 4 by treatment
demand effect (Zizzo, 2010) as an explanation of behavior in our experimental
treatments can be safely excluded. Rather, the most plausible explanation of
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our subjects’ behavior involves increased optimism and trust. Moreover, data
on beliefs strongly point at the fact that subjects in the MK and message
treatments believed that other participants in the session received the same
type of information that they themselves received.
The positive effect of any knowledge level can be detected by looking
at minimum values in column 3. Unlike the control treatment, where a
minimum of 1 is observed both at the belief and at the choice level, in all
experimental treatments the external announcement is able to eliminate the
secure action (i.e., the choice of 1) from both participants choices and fore-
casts. Finally, Table 5 reports the correlation coefficients between first order
beliefs, second order beliefs and choices in round 4 separately for each treat-
ment. As the table shows, all relevant correlation coefficients are positive
and highly significant.
1st order pred. C 2nd order pred. C 4th round choice C
1st order pred. C Corr. Coeff. 1,00 0,86 0,61
Sig. 0,00 0,02
N 15,00 15,00 15,00
2nd order pred. C Corr. Coeff. 0,86 1,00 0,61
Sig. 0,00 0,01
N 15,00 16,00 16,00
1st order pred. MK 2nd order pred. MK 4th round choice MK
1st order pred. MK Corr. Coeff. 1,00 0,80 0,38
Sig. . 0,00 0,04
N 30,00 30,00 30,00
2nd order pred. MK Corr. Coeff. 0,80 1,00 0,59
Sig. 0,00 . 0,00
N 30,00 30,00 30,00
1st order pred. M 2nd order pred. M 4th round choice M
1st order pred. M Corr. Coeff. 1,00 0,92 0,69
Sig. 0,00 0,00
N 26,00 25,00 26,00
2nd order pred. M Corr. Coeff. 0,92 1,00 0,51
Sig. 0,00 . 0,01
N 25,00 25,00 25,00
1st order pred. CK 2nd order pred. CK 4th round choice CK
1st order pred. CK Corr. Coeff. 1,00 0,74 0,76
Sig. . 0,00 0,00
N 18,00 17,00 18,00
2nd order pred. CK Corr. Coeff. 0,74 1,00 0,72
Sig. 0,00 0,00
N 17,00 17,00 17,00
Table 5: Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients (with relative p-values, two-
tailed) between subjects’ 1st order, 2nd order predictions, and 4th round
choices, divided by treatment. The relevant significance values are reported
in bold face.
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5 Refined message treatment
The rationale for the next treatment is to assess the potential impact of the
change in propositional content caused by the linguistic form of the message
treatment19. More specifically, the act of sending a message to the other
player, combined with the ambiguous message content (“We suggest you
to pick 7...”) might have created normative pressure that is absent in the
other two conditions, deriving from a possible interpretation of the sugges-
tion as coming from the other player as well as from the experimenter. To
address this issue, we designed and conducted a further “level-2” treatment
(MK2 henceforth) in which any possible source of normative pressure was
eliminated. In this further treatment, the message exchange phase was left
unaltered, but the whole procedure was rephrased so as to make it explicit
that the suggestion was only from the experimenter, and even the minimal
interaction between players was eliminated.
Hence, the subject’s monitor showed the experimenter’s suggestion, as
in the previous treatment. The lower part of the screen reported now the
following sentence:
“Click here to have the experimenter’s suggestion
visualized on the screen of the participant with
whom you are paired in this round”
Subjects had to click to move to the following screen, which reported the
sentence shown below:
the participant with whom you are paired in this
round is forwarding you this suggestion from the
experimenter
followed by the suggestion text.
The subject was asked to click “read” to send the other player a confir-
mation. The last screen reported:
We confirm that the experimenter’s suggestion has
been visualized on the screen of the participant
with whom you are paired
19We most warmly thank one anonymous referee for pointing out this.
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Then the choice screen appeared. As before, neither the suggestion ap-
pearance nor the message exchange were common knowledge among partici-
pants.
Three sessions of the new treatment were conducted (two sessions with 8
players and one session with 10 players) for a total of 18 subjects. Figure 11
shows average choices over time for the five treatments combined, Figure 13
reports average minima and, finally, figures 14 report the frequency of “7”
choices and 15 that of equilibrium play.
Figure 11: Average choices over time for the five treatments combined
Pairwise comparisons between choice distributions in the first round re-
veal, as before, no statistically significant differences (Mann-Whitney U test;
control-MK2 p = .83; mutual knowledge-MK2 p = .73; message-MK2 p =
.58; common knowledge-MK2 p = .67.) Instead, the share of observed “7”
choices in MK2 in rounds 4-13 is significantly different from both the control
(p = .006) and the message treatment (p = .0001) by a Fisher exact test.
However, it is not different from the mutual knowledge (p = .9) and from the
common knowledge treatment (p = .77). Restricting the analysis to the share
of “7” choices in round 4 only (i.e., immediately after the announcement is
publicly made in the common knowledge treatment), the only significant dif-
ference found is the one between MK2 and the control treatment (p = .05,
Fisher’s exact test, one-tailed).
Finally, the last comparison concerns the percentage of equilibrium play:
all differences are highly significant by the same Fisher exact test (control-
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Figure 12: Average minima
MK2 p = .000; mutual knowledge-MK2 p = .02; message-MK2 p = .000)
except that between MK2 and the common knowledge treatment (p = .3).
6 Conclusions and Further Work
To summarize, our results show that the “control” and “message” treatments
envelope all others along the most important dimensions (average, minima,
percentage of choices of 7, percentage of equilibrium play.) Thus, our exper-
iment reveals two major findings: first, while group knowledge of advice in
weak-link games does increase efficient play and coordination, levels of itera-
tion of knowledge of advice do not matter with regards to the amount of the
increase (in particular common knowledge does not significantly improve over
other kinds of group knowledge); second, second-order mutual knowledge of
advice has significantly different effects, as a fostering coordination device,
depending on the specific mode with which subjects form expectations about
the behavior of their fellow players.
Intuition, sometimes backed by formal results as in the analysis of the
so-called coordinated attack problem (Fagin et al., 1996), has long been sug-
gesting that the rational solution of coordination games required common-
knowledge of the players’ rationality and choices.20 Our results to the effect
20See however Parikh (2005) for an extensive discussion on the far reaching consequence
of finite, indeed small, level knowledge and Hosni and Paris (2005) for an analysis of
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Figure 13: Relative frequency of “7”
that common knowledge of advice does no better than mutual knowledge as
a salience-generating device appears to be quite surprising and meaningful
nonetheless. For instance, in the debate on whether conventions need to be
common knowledge21 weighs in favor of the position that they need not.
Our attempt at explaining this unexpected result is best framed in terms
of the correlated unexpected finding, namely that second-order mutual knowl-
edge of advice may lead to the selection of efficient equilibria more frequently
than any other epistemic condition we investigated.
Why is our second-order mutual knowledge “message” condition so effec-
tive at promoting efficient coordination? To identify a plausible explanation,
it is convenient to focus on the differences between the second-order mutual
knowledge “message” condition and all other conditions in our experiment.
To induce the second-order expectation, subjects are instructed to exchange
messages in order to continue the experiment. Such a direct, first-person
communication exchange is only present in the second-order “message” con-
dition, therefore we surmise that it is an important factor in the explanation
of our results. Indeed, computer-mediated message exchange is known to
give rise to expectations of mutual commitment between players22, both in
coordination which dispenses with common knowledge altogether.
21See for instance Binmore (2008) and Sillari (2008).
22For studies on the normative impact of (even very limited) computer-mediated com-
munication in mixed-motive games see Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) and Bicchieri, Chavez
and Lev-On (2010), among others.
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Figure 14: Frequency of “7”
the sense that receiving the message makes the receiver believe that the
sender will do her part to honor the advice, and in the sense that sending
the message makes the sender believe that the receiver will expect that the
sender ought to conform to the advice she sent. In short, first-person message
exchange may elicit a norm of promise-keeping.
Thus, not only it is relevant what kind of beliefs players hold, but also how
they arrived at holding such beliefs. In particular, beliefs formed through
the embryonic communication used in our second-order “message” condi-
tion seem to foster compliance with the content of the exchanged message.
Recall how in Bicchieri’s theory of social norms second-order expectations
play a crucial role as normative expectations. While first-order, empirical
expectations may not suffice to motivate compliance with the social norm,
first- and second-order expectations, when aligned, may succeed in bring-
ing about norm compliance. Our study is not concerned with social norms,
however the coordination success observed in our second-order mutual knowl-
edge condition, paired with the observation of high correlation between first-,
second-order beliefs, and choices, highlights the relevance of second-order ex-
pectations for motivating action. In light of this observation, our hypothesis
that subjects’ second-order beliefs have normative content calls for further
research.
Our result that second-order mutual knowledge works better than first-
order in fostering efficient equilibrium choices may lead to the generalization
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Figure 15: Frequency of equilibrium plays
that there is a monotonic relationship between players’ abidance to advice
and levels of mutual knowledge of advice. If that were the case, common
knowledge of advice would result in highest level of efficient coordination.
However, that is not what is observed in our common knowledge condition,
lending support to the hypothesis formulated above that second-order expec-
tations carry more weight because of their normative character. Our results,
however, suggest not only that common knowledge of advice is not necessary
to achieve efficient coordination, but also that it is not sufficient. This re-
sult bears on the literature on the relation between convention and common
knowledge, showing that common knowledge is not the most effective device
for creating salience and fostering efficient coordination, at least in the short
run.
We would like to close this paper by insisting on our finding that coor-
dination is more likely under mutual knowledge than common knowledge of
advice. As we noted before the surprise might be accounted for by assuming
a psychological relevance of the suggestion. If true this might suggest that
belief formation mechanism weights more than the sole epistemic condition
(common knowledge) towards the selection of the efficient equilibrium. This
interpretation seems to be posing a challenge for bayesian epistemology, in-
sofar as the latter focusses only on the information revealed by the agent’s
(degrees of) belief. Yet the challenge is only apparent, for the surprising per-
formance of mutual knowledge in the message treatment might well depend
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on the subjects’ “updating” on the expectation of mutual commitment. This
emerging notion of belief update, however, clearly deserves further investiga-
tion.
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A Experimental Instructions
A.1 General Instructions (common to all treatments)
A.1.1 Introduction
Welcome! You are about to participate in an experiment on decision making
funded by the Ministry of Education, University and Research. Instructions
are simple, and if you follow them correctly and make appropriate decisions
you will be able to earn an appreciable sum of money that will be paid
to you privately and in cash. All choices that you make will be stored and
processed anonymously. All your earnings in the experiment will be expressed
in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). 1 ECU is worth 1 euro.
A.1.2 The choice task
The present experimental session is composed of 10 participants and will
last a total of 13 periods, divided into 2 parts: the first part will last for
3 periods, and the remaining part will last for 10 periods. The choice task
will be the same for all the 13 periods. You are now listening to the initial
instructions, to be followed by further written instructions that will appear
on your monitor. At the beginning of each period the software will pair each
of you with another participant from the room picked randomly. You and the
other participant will both have to choose - independently from one another
and without any possibility to communicate - one and only one number from
1 to 7 (included). The euros you earn will depend on the number you have
chosen and on the minimum number that has been chosen in the pair (that is,
the lower number between the one chosen by you and the one chosen by the
participant with whom you are paired). Each of you has been given a paper
copy of the double-entry table that will help you compute your earnings. The
table is identical for all participants, and the same table will appear on your
monitor every time you will have to make your choice for the round. Please
have a look at the table now. The rows of the table report your possible
choices in every period, i.e., the numbers from 1 to 7. The columns report
the minimum number that has been chosen in the pair.
38
The table cells report the ECUs that you earn in correspondence of each
possible outcome. The ECUs you earn are in the cell at the intersection
between the row corresponding to the number you have chosen and the col-
umn corresponding to the minimum number chosen. For example, suppose
you choose number 4 and the other participant chooses number 3: the mini-
mum number in the pair is 3: therefore, your earnings are in the cell at the
intersection between row 4 and column 3 (that is 8 ECUs).
Now, please pay attention to your monitor. The central part of the screen
(green background) reports your earnings table, which is identical to the
paper copy that you have. You will have to make your choice by typing the
number chosen in the appropriate text box at the center of the blue square
and by clicking on ‘OK’. When all participants have chosen, your monitor will
show you the period outcome: the number you have chosen, the minimum
number chosen and the ECUs you have earned. At any time you will be
able to double-check that your earnings have been computed correctly by
using the copy of the earnings table that has been given to you. By clicking
on ‘Continue’ you will move to the next period. Please remember that at
the beginning of each period the software will match you with a participant
picked randomly; therefore, in general you will be paired with a different
participant in each period, although it will happen that you will be paired
with someone more than once. In any case you will never be told the identity
of the participants with whom you are paired.
At the end of the third period the experiment will be interrupted and the
monitor will show you further instructions for you to follow. At some point,
BEFORE YOU MAKE YOUR CHOICE FOR PERIOD 4, the experimenter
will ask you to take the blank sheet of paper that is on your desk and write
the following 2 predictions:
• The average number that will be chosen by all participants in period
4, i.e. the arithmetic mean of all choices in period 4
• The average prediction of participants, i.e., the average of all partici-
pants’ forecasts regarding choices in period 4
This information will be asked only at the beginning of period 4, and you
will be paid in the following way: for each prediction, you will earn 1 euro
minus the arithmetic difference between your predicted value and the realized
value, for a maximum of 2 euro in the case in which both your predictions are
39
100 per cent correct. The true realized values will be computed and publicly
revealed at the end of the experiment.
A.1.3 Your earnings
Your earnings will be computed as follows: at the end of the experiment, the
software will randomly pick one among the 13 periods, and each of you will
be paid according to the ECUs he/she has earned in that period. The final
screenshot will inform you of which period has been extracted and of how
many ECUs you have earned. This earnings will be summed to the earnings
from your predictions and to the 2 euro show up fee. Each one of you will
be paid privately in cash. After receiving your payment, you will be free to
leave the lab.
We now ask you to respond to all the questions reported in the anonymous
questionnaire that has just been handed to you, and to give the questionnaire
back to the experimenter. In case of incorrect answers, the relevant part
of the instructions will be repeated. During the experiment you are not
allowed to communicate in any way. If any forms of verbal or non-verbal
communication are detected, the session will be immediately interrupted and
nobody will be paid.
If you have questions, please raise your hands now.
A.2 Control questions (common to all treatments)
The present questionnaire is anonymous and only serves the purpose of mak-
ing sure that all participants have understood the rules of the experiment
before it starts.
• QUESTION 1. Imagine you have chosen number 1 in a period, and
imagine that the participant with whom you are paired has chosen
number 3. According to the table, how many ECUs have you earned?
How many ECUs has he/she earned?
• QUESTION 2. Imagine you have chosen number 3 in a period, and
imagine that the participant with whom you are paired has chosen
number 2. According to the table, how many ECUs have you earned?
How many ECUs has he/she earned?
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• QUESTION 3. Your earnings will be determined by the ECUs that
you have earned in one of the 13 periods that will be picked randomly
by the software: TRUE or FALSE (mark with an X)
• QUESTION 4. You will always be paired with the same participant
for all 13 periods: TRUE or FALSE (mark with an X)
A.3 Treatment-specific instructions appearing on each
subject’s monitor at the start of round 4
Note that these instructions were not read aloud.
A.3.1 Control treatment
Before proceeding to make your choices for the remaining 10 periods, the
experimenter will ask you to write down your predictions for period 4 on the
blank sheet of paper that you can find on your desk. After all participants
have written their predictions, the experiment will restart. The matching
rules and the rules determining your earnings in each period remain invariant
• PREDICTION 1: the average number that will be chosen by all par-
ticipants in period 4, i.e. the arithmetic mean of all choices in period
4
• PREDICTION 2: the average prediction of participants, i.e., the aver-
age of all participants’ forecast regarding choices in period 4
Now please write your predictions.
A.3.2 Mutual knowledge treatment
Before proceeding to make your choices for the remaining 10 periods, the
experimenter will ask you to write down your predictions for period 4 on the
blank sheet of paper that you can find on your desk. After all participants
have written their predictions, the experiment will restart. The matching
rules and the rules determining your earnings in each period remain invariant
SUGGESTION
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WE SUGGEST YOU TO CHOOSE NUMBER 7. Note, in fact,
that if both participants choose number 7, they both earn their
maximum earnings, that is 13 ECUs
Now please write your predictions:
• PREDICTION 1: the average number that will be chosen by all par-
ticipants in period 4, i.e. the arithmetic mean of all choices in period
4
• PREDICTION 2: the average prediction of participants, i.e., the aver-
age of all participants’ forecast regarding choices in period 4
A.3.3 Message treatment
Before proceeding to make your choices for the remaining 10 periods, follow
the instructions that will appear on your monitor. The software will create
the random pairings among participants. Then you will be shown a message
and you will be asked to send the message to the participant with whom you
have been paired for period 4.
BEFORE you make your choice the experimenter will ask you to write
down your predictions for period 4 on the blank sheet of paper that you can
find on your desk. After all participants have written their predictions, the
experiment will restart. The matching rules and the rules determining your
earnings in each period remain invariant. Now please follow the instructions
on your monitor and then wait for the experimenter to tell you to write down
your predictions. es
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Reviewer 1
Thanks for the kind words. We have answered the reviewer’s remarks punc-
tually below:
1a first of all: one typo/notational remark: p. 13 (x1 = . . . = xn = 7).
In the experiment you have n = 2, thus it would suffice to write (x =
1 = x2 = 7)
answer We have rewritten the paragraph taking into account the reviewer’s
suggestion.
1b Table 1 (Payoff table) In a two player game a natural idea would be
to depict own choice against opponent’s choice rather than own choice
against minimum of the two. Is there a special reason to take the
latter?
answer We have decided to keep our table in order to make results compa-
rable to the previous literature, and explained this in a footnote.
1c Orders of Knowledge: I have the impression the Message-Message
condition does not create second, but third order information. First or-
der is the information itsself, second order is sending a message about
the information to the other player and third order is sending the con-
firmation back. Even when starting to count the levels at a different
position that seems to be definitely two levels above the information
given in the mutual knowledge condition, not only 1.
answer It seems as though the referee is talking about levels of belief
rather than levels of knowledge. In the “Message-Message” con-
dition we see that
1. Statement appears on my screen → I know “suggestion”
2. I click ”send” → I know “suggestion” (knowledge level does
not increase here, because I can’t be sure you have received
my message)
3. I receive the acknowledgment → I know that you know “sug-
gestion”
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While, as the referee seem to be suggesting, it is likely that at (2) I
will believe that you know the suggestion, what we are interested
here is levels of “hard” information. In this sense, it is only when
I receive confirmation at (3) about you having read the suggestion
that second order knowledge is attained. As the epistemic analysis
is a relatively new tool in the literature, we prefer to keep our focus
on knowledge only, leaving the study of belief and other attitudes
to future research.
We have added a footnote in the text addressing this issue.
1d Table 4: It would be intersting to have information on how often the
minimum/maximum are played. The way the table looks like the infor-
mation is contingent and the conclusions drawn from it seem contingent
- especially given the different group sizes for the different groups.
answer While we agree that the referee is raising a relevant point, we
decided not to delve deeper in the analysis of beliefs, as the main
focus of our contribution is the analysis of choices induced by the
suggestion.
1e Another remark to table 4: A remarkable fact is that in three
of the four groups the actual choice averages higher than the average
of both, the first and the 2nd order belief. Given that playing above
the expected average seems to be risky strategy (resp. staying slightly
below sounds like a safe strategy), this seems irrational... or at least it
seems as if there is no direct connection between expectation and the
own move.
answer We say that “rendered subjects on average more optimistic, and
greater optimism in turn induced the choice of the risky action sig-
nificantly more often”. We have expanded on this remarking that
an average choice larger than the average prediction also indicates
optimistic, risk-seeking behavior.
1f p.6. ’...emerge as a constraints that we are justified to impose on the
relation R. This sentence sounds a bit mixed up. The differences in
the formalization ARE the different relations (and their properties),
but these differences are justified by the concepts of knowledge/belief
itsself, not by the relation.
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answer We have rephrased the sentence to avoid potential ambiguities.
Reviewer 2
The second reviewer raises important criticisms that persuaded us of the ne-
cessity of including a further experimental condition in order to properly ad-
dress them. The main point is that our “Message” treatment is not homoge-
neous with our “Mutual Knowledge” and “Common Knowledge” treatments,
in that its propositional content (“I suggest you to play 7”) is different from
the propositional content of the other treatments (“the experimenters sug-
gest you to play 7.”) We agreed on the reviewer’s criticism and added a new
treatment homogenous with “Mutual Knowledge” and “Common Knowl-
edge.” Punctual answers below:
2a The first suggestion is merely cosmetic: it is that section 1 be short-
ened. The general remarks about the relationship between formal epis-
temology and experimental analysis are unnecessary, since they don’t
really reveal anything about the bearing of this particular experiment
on the formal epistemology literature. In addition, the authors need
not spend so much time spelling out the whole formal framework (ac-
cessibility relation, etc.), given that neither the experiment itself nor
the discussion of it makes use of it. But this is merely a cosmetic point:
I didn’t find anything factually or philosophically objectionable about
the content of this section.
answer Our experimental setting suggests that the mode of communica-
tion may be more relevant than the actual epistemic content of
the communicative act. This flies in the face of the qualitative dif-
ference between the finitary operation of mutual knowledge and
the infinitary one of common knowledge. The purpose of having a
rather detailed (albeit still very sketchy!) analysis of the formalisa-
tion of epistemic logic is fully functional to marking this contrast.
We have added a paragraph in the conclusions emphasising this
fact.
2b I have several worries concerning about the content of the proposi-
tion that is mutual-1/multual-2/common knowledge. The proposition
which the subject sees is this: ”We suggest that you pick 7.” There are
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two ways to read this proposition: as an imperative and as an indica-
tive. This suggests two different types of mutual knowledge that might
be generated. On the imperative reading, level 1 would be ”player 1
knows that he should pick 7 and player 2 knows that she should pick
7,” and level 2 would be ”player 2 knows that player 1 knows player
2 should pick 7 and player 1 knows that player 2 knows that player 1
should pick 7.” On the indicative reading, level 1 would be ”player 1
knows that he is told to pick 7 and player 2 knows that she is told to
pick 7” and level 2 would be ”player 2 knows that player 1 is told to
pick 7 and player 1 knows that player 2 is told to pick 7.” (Or even:
”player 1 knows that if both pick 7 then they will get the highest pay-
off” etc.) The authors ought to explicitly state what they are trying to
elicit levels of knowledge of. I take it to be the indicative reading, but
it should be explicit. (This is more or less a cosmetic suggestion.)
answer We have added a paragraph (end of page 12) clarifying what is
the propositional content elicited in the experimental treatments.
2c Levels of knowledge of either of these propositions would be inter-
esting to examine. However, it appears to me that what is actually
elicited in the mutual-knowledge-level-2 condition is ”player 2 knows
that player 1 is telling her to pick 7,” since, as far as I can tell from
the experimental design, the message that each subject is sending to
the other player is ”We suggest you to pick number 7” (not, for ex-
ample, ”The experimenter has suggested to me that I pick 7”) and it
is called ”the suggestion” (not, for example, ”information about the
suggestion”).
There are two major substantive problems with this. The first is that
there is normative pressure to choose 7 in the mutual-2 condition that
there is not in the mutual-1 condition. This arises from two different
sources: first, that the other player is telling you to choose 7, and
second, that you are telling the other player to choose 7 (and so one
might think you are incurring an obligation to do what is best for the
other player, conditional on her choosing 7). The experiment is billed
as examining a purely epistemic phenomenon, and so the very plausible
existence of normative pressure does undermine this claim. The authors
do examine this possibility in the conclusion, and cite it as an area for
further research: however, it seems to me to be the obvious explanation
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for the data, and therefore an experimental design flaw. In other words,
the authors say that they’ve found a surprising result, and suggest a
factor that might be the cause and should be explored further: but
given that the factor is present as a result of the experimental design,
it seems that we don’t yet have a ”surprising” result. (If the authors
want to keep the experiment as is, they ought to further explain how
the finding moves the debate forward.)
answer We agree with the referee’s assessment and we have changed the
phrasing of our conclusions accordingly.
2d The second, and more devastating, problem is that given what is
actually elicited in the mutual-2 condition, the proposition in which
the players have common knowledge in the ”common knowledge” con-
dition different than the proposition in which the players have mu-
tual knowledge in the mutual-2 condition. Therefore, the experiment
hasn’t shown that there is a difference between mutual and common
knowledge of the same proposition. I suggest that the authors ei-
ther reword the mutual-knowledge-level-2 condition or rewording the
common-knowledge condition so that they differ only in knowledge
structure, not in propositional content.
answer This is the remark that prompted us to run the new treatment
session. We have modified our “message” treatment so that it is
now crystal-clear that subjects are merely forwarding the exper-
imenter’s suggestion and not sending their own. The rephrasing
of the experimental setup in our view makes the new treatment
semantically homogeneous to the ones based on mutual and com-
mon knowledge. The results of this new session are described and
analyzed in section 5, and are taken into account in the Conclu-
sions of our paper.
2e The following is a substantive point, but smaller. I would like the
authors to say something about how knowledge of ”advice” is different
from knowledge of facts. In the original Lewis discussion of salience, the
idea was that convention is established when two potential coordinators
have (levels of) knowledge that a particular choice is salient. This
knowledge then exerts normative pressure because it produces mutual
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expectations, and if one expects the other to choose etc., then if one
does not choose in accordance, one fails to do what is best for oneself.
But the content of the knowledge is not itself supposed to be normative
in character. Indeed, if the proposition one had (levels of) knowledge
of was that a particular outcome is normative (or recommended or
advised) rather than salient, then this undermines the claim that the
game gives rise to a convention in Lewis’s sense. The Chaudhuri studies
et al cited by the authors use the idea of advice, too, so I suppose it is
not unprecedented in this literature, but I think it needs to be defended,
at least briefly.
answer We have added a paragraph at the end of section 2 addressing
this remark. The main idea is that “knowledge of advice” as it
is studied in our paper and in the strand of literature we men-
tion (Chaudhuri, etc.) is in fact relevant to Lewis-conventions. In
Lewis’ account, (common) knowledge of precedent induces in the
agents a belief that they will pick the action made salient by its be-
ing a successful precedent. In our experimental setup, knowledge
of advice induces in the agents a belief that they will pick the ac-
tion made salient by being the recommended one. The symmetry
reveals that, at bottom level, we are looking at the effectiveness
of advice as a salience-building mechanism.
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